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TO BELIEVE IN BLACK STARS OR RED DRAGONS?: 
COMPARING THE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
CLIMATES OF GHANA AND CHINA 
ABSTRACT 
When thinking of overseas business expansion, most think of China. This is 
for good reason: China commands a lion’s share of foreign direct investment 
money. It would shock readers to know that there are destinations that are far 
more suitable for overseas investment than China. It would shock readers even 
more to know that one of these destinations is in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Ghana—the Black Star country—has quietly put together a legal regime 
that is extremely attractive for foreign direct investment. When comparing 
Ghana’s foreign investment policies to China’s, Ghana’s policies are in-
disputably more favorable to foreign investors. Ghana offers more incen-
tives, imposes fewer restrictions, and the administrative side is considerably 
more transparent. This Note will show that the prospective foreign direct 
investor should look to Ghana as a more hospitable destination for pro-
posed foreign enterprises. 
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INTRODUCTION 
China provides the world’s blueprint of how an impoverished country can 
fast-track itself into becoming a global economic power. Over the last thirty 
years, the eastern country has become a hotbed for overseas expansion for 
multinational enterprises. By contrast, the coastal African country of Ghana is 
seemingly overlooked as a destination for foreign business expansion.1 
Both countries have a similar history and timeline. The two countries 
emerged from their most formative revolutionary periods just seven years 
apart, immediately adopted policies of isolationism and economic national-
ism, and later liberalized in order to attract foreign investment to strengthen 
their respective economies.2 Despite the similarities in their beginnings, Chi-
na emerged as a success story, while Ghana ultimately declined.3 Are the re-
sults of these two developing countries a function of the attractiveness of their 
respective foreign direct investment policies? 
This Note will show that the foreign direct investment policies of Ghana 
are significantly more attractive than those of China. It will highlight Gha-
na’s Investment Promotion Center Act of 1994 and juxtapose it against 
comparable Chinese policy. The comparison will show that Ghana offers 
more incentives, clarity, and transparency, as well as fewer restrictions in 
tailoring its foreign direct investment policy. 
Part I will give the reader an understanding of what foreign direct in-
vestment is. After defining the term, this Part will answer the questions of 
why business entities look to expand abroad, why host countries look to at-
tract foreign direct investment (FDI), what are the dangers to host countries 
that they seek to avoid with policymaking, what policies attract and deter 
FDI, and why has FDI not flowed to Africa in significant quantities. Part II 
will explore the backgrounds of China and Ghana as they relate to invest-
ment policy and their history and effectiveness in attracting FDI. Part III 
will compare Ghana’s Investment Promotion Centre Act to the FDI policies 
fashioned by China. This Part will proceed by first comparing restrictions, 
then incentives, and finally the level of ambiguity in regulation of FDI. 
With each of these comparisons, the Note will detail the most attractive 
types of policy developed with respect to these three areas, explain the ra-
tionale behind such policy, and show what the policies enacted by Ghana 
and China mean to internationally expanding investors. By the conclusion 
of the Note, the learned reader-investor should be convinced that Ghana is a 
more viable investment destination than China. 
                                                 
1 See infra Part II.C. 
2 See infra Part II.A–C. 
3 See infra Part II.C. 
720 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:717 
I. WHAT IS FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI)? 
A. Definition of FDI 
There is no generally accepted common definition of foreign direct in-
vestment. The World Trade Organization defines FDI as “when an investor 
based in one country (the home country) acquires an asset in another coun-
try (the host country) with the intent to manage that asset.”4 The definition 
used by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development requires 
the intent to “acquire a lasting interest” in a foreign enterprise.5 Still, other 
definitions place more significance on the aspect of control of a company in 
a foreign country by way of ownership of a “significant amount” of stock or 
asset ownership.6 The United States Department of Commerce establishes a 
bright line minimum for such a significant amount at ten percent ownership 
of a company operating abroad.7 
For the purposes of this Note, FDI will be defined as the possession of a 
controlling interest of a business operating abroad. This encompasses whol-
ly owned foreign businesses, joint ventures with partners in the foreign 
country, and, most commonly, mergers and acquisitions of foreign entities.8 
FDI does not encompass a straight portfolio investment because the investor 
acquires no relevant degree of control over a company.9 Common examples 
of portfolio investment would be the purchase of foreign corporate bonds 
and smaller amounts of foreign stock.10 The line between portfolio invest-
ment and FDI is crossed when the investor moves past profiting from the 
business of a foreign enterprise and on to actually driving the profit of the 
foreign-operating business.11 
B. Impact of FDI on Developing Host Countries 
FDI, by itself, has the potential to drive an economy like an overcharged 
engine. The economies of Singapore and Hong Kong are composed largely 
                                                 
4 REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH & MARTIN B. TITTLE, INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: OVERVIEW AND CURRENT STATUS 3 
(2002), available at http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=35117232. 
5 DAMBISA MOYO, DEAD AID: WHY AID IS NOT WORKING AND HOW THERE IS A 
BETTER WAY FOR AFRICA 98 (2009). 
6 Richard J. Hunter, Jr., Legal Considerations in Foreign Direct Investment, 28 OKLA. 
CITY U. L. REV. 851, 853 (2003). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 855 (noting that cross-border mergers have been a dominant form of FDI ever 
since 1999, where cross-border mergers and acquisitions increased by thirty-five percent). 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 See id. 
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of FDI.12 FDI inflows can directly benefit the economy of a host country. 
For one, FDI brings the surplus of wealth of advanced countries into devel-
oping ones. Some scholars even argue that FDI is a much more effective 
means of achieving economic development than more generally used meth-
ods, such as foreign aid and International Monetary Fund loans.13 Eco-
nomic development is achieved through FDI by the “increased capital flows 
into countries with limited domestic financial sources....”14 The increased 
amount of capital also brings more jobs into the domestic economy, places 
more money in circulation (allowing for the accrual and formation of capi-
tal by local parties), and leads to regional development.15 Additionally, 
with a significant amount of FDI being focused toward either exporting 
products manufactured in the host country, or producing products for the 
consumption of the host country (that would otherwise be imported), FDI 
inflows reduce trade deficits in the host country by either increasing ex-
ports or reducing imports.16 
Aside from the direct impact on the economy, FDI proponents also 
highlight the potential for “spillover” effects on the host country.17 The 
most significant and accepted of these spillovers involves the diffusion of 
competitive information and technology to lesser-developed countries.18 
Naturally, when a multinational corporation (MNC) or other business enti-
ty enters into a foreign market, it will bring its proprietary technology and 
processes that it uses to maintain a competitive advantage.19 This includes 
management, organizational, and marketing expertise. Domestic partners 
(and employees) can learn from the foreign enterprise’s capabilities, tech-
nology, management expertise, and industry insights.20 
This diffusion process starts with the introduction of new hardware or 
processes—and the skills necessary to operate the hardware or conduct those 
                                                 
12 FDI is thirty-one percent of Hong Kong’s GDP and seventeen percent of Singapore’s 
GDP. See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2011, at 189, 
U.N. Sales No. E.11.II.D.2 (2011), available at http://www.unctad-docs.org/files/UNCT
AD-WIR2011-Full-en.pdf (listing each country’s GDP); World Economic Outlook Database, 
INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/weodata/index
.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (providing a database listing each country’s GDP). 
13 See generally MOYO, supra note 5. 
14 Hunter, supra note 6, at 851. 
15 See MOYO, supra note 5, at 101–02; Hunter, supra note 6, at 862. 
16 Hunter, supra note 6, at 868. 
17 See, e.g., id. at 862. 
18 See id. at 855. 
19 MAGNUS BLOMSTROM ET AL., FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: FIRM AND HOST 
COUNTRY STRATEGIES 103 (2000). 
20 DAVID CONKLIN & DON LECRAW, FOREIGN OWNERSHIP RESTRICTIONS AND 
LIBERALIZATION REFORMS 70–71 (1997). 
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processes—to the host country. Potential adopters in the host country come 
into contact with the innovation, information about it is diffused, uncertain-
ty about it is lessened, and, ultimately, the probability of adoption is in-
creased.21 The adoption process can consist of duplicating the innovation 
and hiring workers already trained by the foreign entity.22 Additionally, the 
adoption of technology forces the multinational enterprise (MNE) to create 
more innovations to compete with duplicated processes and technology and 
also puts internal pressure on host-country domestic enterprises to compete 
with the new innovations.23 
FDI can increase the training of a host country’s workforce in the same 
manner that it can bring innovation to a host country.24 Because education is 
typically lacking in developing countries, the training brought by MNEs is 
crucial.25 MNCs provide much more worker training than do host country 
domestic businesses.26 Management expertise, in particular, is improved in 
the FDI host country.27 A training diffusion occurs when MNEs train man-
agers, who later move to other firms and dissipate their acquired manage-
ment expertise.28 Although it can be hard to lure away managers from 
MNEs given the typically higher salary, this diffusion has been realized in 
places like South America, where managers found in domestic firms often 
start their careers in MNCs.29 
It is also worth noting that, in addition to helping diffuse innovation 
and training, MNEs also assist in the advancement of domestic parties 
within the MNEs’ supply chains.30 When an MNE decides to source local-
ly from the host country, it needs inputs that will meet its quality standards 
so that it can produce a high-quality output. If the suppliers do not have 
adequate technology, training, or processes, then they cannot meet the 
MNE’s need. MNEs eliminate this problem by helping suppliers set up 
production, providing technical information, and providing training.31 The 
assisted suppliers can grow from small, local businesses with limited ca-
pabilities to larger, nationally or globally competitive firms. 
                                                 
21 BLOMSTROM ET AL., supra note 19, at 105. 
22 Id. at 101. 
23 Id. at 103. 
24 Id. at 116. 
25 Id. at 117. 
26 Id. at 117–18 (using Hong Kong as an example). 
27 MOYO, supra note 5, at 101. 
28 BLOMSTROM ET AL., supra note 19, at 117. 
29 Id. 
30 Smita Kulkarni et al., McDonald’s Ongoing Marketing Challenge: Social Perception 
in India, 1 ONLINE J. OF INT’L. CASE ANALYSIS, Jan. 31, 2009, at 1, 9, http://ojica.fiu.edu
/index.php/ojica_journal/article/viewFile/19/18. 
31 BLOMSTROM ET AL., supra note 19, at 113. 
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McDonald’s is one of the most widely known practitioners of supplier 
development.32 When it entered India, it faced substantial supply chain inad-
equacies.33 It trained its supplier of lettuce, Trikaya Agriculture, in advanced 
irrigation and food storage.34 Trikaya—once a small, local agribusiness—was 
able to supply produce to not only all of the India-based McDonald’s loca-
tions, but also to begin supplying exports from Austria to the Pacific.35 
Alabama’s courtship of major foreign automotive players showcased 
each of the above benefits of attracting FDI. The once destitute state at-
tracted production from four major foreign car companies from 1993 to 
2002—Mercedes-Benz, Toyota, Honda, and Hyundai.36 The most notable 
cases were Mercedes-Benz and Hyundai.37 The state of Alabama offered 
incentives packages valued at around $253 billion in each case.38 
While these expenditures did amount to a large investment, the return 
has more than justified the cost. The Mercedes site created 1500 jobs,39 
while the Hyundai site created 2000.40 The Montgomery, Alabama Hyundai 
site alone creates $99 million in earnings for its employees.41 
The indirect benefits were just as significant. It was estimated that an-
other 6000 indirect jobs would be created (with annual earnings of $180 
million) by Hyundai suppliers and “spin-off” enterprises such as mainte-
nance, services, construction, and retail.42 The same effect was forecasted 
for the Mercedes-Benz venture.43 Once these large firms established them-
selves in Alabama, support firms followed to meet their production de-
mands.44 For example, Johnson Controls, Inc., a Milwaukee-based manufac-
turer, set up operations in Alabama to produce car seats for the Tuscaloosa, 
                                                 
32 Kulkarni et al., supra note 30, at 4. 
33 Id. at 12. 
34 Id. at 13. 
35 Id. 
36 Foreign Car-Makers Put Once-Poor US State on the Road to Better Times, THE 
IRISH TIMES, Apr. 19, 2002, at 63 [hereinafter Road to Better Times]. 
37 STEPHEN D. COHEN, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT 167 (2007). 
38 Id. 
39 James Bennet, Mercedes Selects Alabama Site, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1993, at D1, 
available at LEXIS-NEXIS COMPANY NEWS. 
40 Road to Better Times, supra note 36. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 See Bennet, supra note 39. 
44 Mercedes-Benz Project: First-Year in Alabama—Progress Report, PR NEWSWIRE, 
Sept. 28, 1994, available at LEXIS-NEXIS FINANCIAL NEWS [hereinafter Mercedes-Benz 
Project] (“A number of Mercedes-Benz systems suppliers have decided to locate in 
Alabama to meet our ‘just in time’ and ‘just in sequence’ delivery requirements.”). 
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Alabama Mercedes-Benz facility.45 Likewise, Rockwell Automotive, based 
in Michigan, established operations in Alabama to supply the Mercedes-Benz 
plant with sunroofs.46 
The indirect benefits of these ventures reached outside of Alabama, as 
well. Perhaps the most notable example was IBM’s multimillion-dollar 
contract to design the technology blueprint for the Tuscaloosa plant.47 Al-
bert Kahn Associates, Inc., of Detroit, handled the architectural and engi-
neering design of the facility,48 Fluor Daniel Inc. of Irvine, California was 
awarded the construction management contract,49 and Ohio’s Packard 
Electric was awarded the contract to design electrical distribution for the 
plant.50 Even the United States Treasury was touched by the FDI installa-
tions, as half of the Mercedes-Benz vehicles produced in Tuscaloosa were 
intended for export from the United States.51 
By the installation of the Hyundai plant in 2002, the automotive indus-
try in Alabama had appeared out of nowhere and become a staple of the 
state’s economy.52 At this point, Alabama had 220 automotive manufac-
turing companies employing 300,000 workers.53 By 2006 an estimated 
600,000 vehicles would be coming from a state that had produced none 
just a decade earlier.54 Hyundai’s venture was estimated to generate a posi-
tive economic impact of as much as $280 million per year, allowing the 
state to recuperate its investment by 2011.55 Additionally, growth prospects 
are high because DaimlerChrysler—twelve percent owner of Hyundai—has 
invested another $600 million to double production at Montgomery, raising 
employment to 4000.56 
                                                 
45 Johnson Controls to Supply Headliners ‘Just-in-Time’ for Mercedes-Benz All Activity 
Vehicle, PR NEWSWIRE, Aug. 5, 1994, available at LEXIS-NEXIS FINANCIAL NEWS. 
46 Rockwell to Produce Sunroof Assemblies for New Mercedes-Benz All-Activity 
Vehicle, PR NEWSWIRE, Aug. 8, 1994, available at LEXIS-NEXIS FINANCIAL NEWS. 
47 I.B.M. Gets Mercedes-Benz Contract for Alabama Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1994, 
at p. 39, available at LEXIS-NEXIS COMPANY NEWS; IBM Wins Mercedes-Benz Consult-
ing Contract, BUSINESS WIRE, Feb. 18, 1994, available at LEXIS-NEXIS. 
48 Mercedes-Benz Awards Construction Management and Architectural/Engineering 
Design Contracts for New Tuscaloosa Plant, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan. 11, 1994, available at 
LEXIS-NEXIS FINANCIAL NEWS. 
49 Id. 
50 Packard Electric Is Awarded Mercedes-Benz Project, PR NEWSWIRE, Aug. 5, 1994, 
available at LEXIS-NEXIS FINANCIAL NEWS. 
51 Mercedes-Benz Project, supra note 44. 
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Benefits were bestowed on both sides of these FDI ventures. The com-
panies were able to decrease their production and marketing costs as well 
as move closer to their customers.57 Alabama received an injection of jobs, 
a relocation of established American firms, and the creation of a booming 
automotive industry. Alabama represents a strong case for the positive 
side of FDI. 
C. Policy and the FDI Climate 
The “FDI climate” has been understood by various authors to encom-
pass the economic conditions, infrastructure, social conditions (for exam-
ple, labor policy conditions), political climate (such as risks associated 
with hostile or unstable regimes), and FDI policy.58 Excluding FDI policy 
and political risk, a country can have an attractive environment for FDI by 
having cheap labor, yields that are greater than what can be achieved 
elsewhere, and access to natural resources.59 
With respect to building an attractive FDI policy regime, the require-
ments can be more extensive. In general, attractive FDI policy imposes few 
restrictions, provides for national treatment—or better than national treat-
ment—of foreign enterprises, is backed by sound commercial law, has 
transparent customs regulations and a fair tax code, and includes an agen-
cy that facilitates, rather than hinders, investment.60 The legal rights of 
foreign enterprises must be “adequately balanced and protected” and must 
“guaranty fairness in adjudication.”61 
Incentives that make the FDI climate attractive can be divided into 
three categories: fiscal incentives, financial incentives, and other incen-
tives. Fiscal incentives are those that reduce tax expenses.62 These include 
reductions in the corporate tax rate, tax holidays (deferrals on taxes for a 
number of years), accelerated depreciation allowances, tax credits for profit 
that is reinvested in the host country, and exemptions from export or im-
port duties and value-added taxes.63 
                                                 
57 Robert Schoenberger, Long-term Relationships Put Alabama 1st, Official Says, THE 
CLARION LEDGER, Oct. 20, 2001, at 1C (noting that by producing vehicles in Alabama, 
these companies would avoid a twenty-five percent import tariff on vehicles); see Bennet, 
supra note 39. 
58 See LARS H. THUNELL, POLITICAL RISKS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: INVESTMENT 
BEHAVIOR OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 5–6 (1977). 
59 Hunter, supra note 6, at 870–71. 
60 Id. at 871–72. 
61 Id. at 872. 
62 COHEN, supra note 37, at 165. 
63 Id. 
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Financial incentives are typically direct grants of money, such as sub-
sidies for land, labor, training, construction, or low-interest loans.64 A preva-
lent example of financial incentive packages would be the two $253 mil-
lion packages that Alabama gave to Mercedez-Benz and Hyundai to allure 
the companies into locating manufacturing plants there in 1993 and 2002, 
respectively.65 While this type of incentive is effective, it is generally una-
vailable to the developing country, which does not have large sums of sur-
plus cash to finance such packages. Consequentially, fiscal incentives are 
easier for developed countries to implement. 
Other incentives do not deal directly with finances, but make entry into 
the host country easier. These include infrastructure development (such as 
laying communication lines for a proposed production site) and closing the 
market to foreign competitors.66 Having an agency that facilitates foreign 
investment can also be put into this category. Singapore and Ireland fea-
ture “one-stop shop” agencies that make the administrative and legal mat-
ters of establishing a foreign enterprise relatively painless.67 Those two 
countries are behind only Hong Kong in annual FDI inflow per capita.68 
D. Why Does FDI Not Flow to Sub-Saharan Africa? 
Put in perspective, at times, China’s annual FDI inflows have been 
more than five times that of the entire continent of Africa.69 FDI flows into 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa seem to be hindered, mostly not by the 
unattractiveness of their FDI policies, but more by the social, economic, 
and political factors that make up the FDI climate.70 MNEs are naturally 
encouraged to invest where they can make a higher return and where labor 
costs are low.71 Since the African markets are not as crowded with MNEs, 
the potential for return on investment is higher.72 MNEs in Africa stand to 
make returns sixty-six percent higher than those in Southeast Asia, Eu-
rope, and the Pacific, and fifty percent higher than those in South Ameri-
ca.73 Additionally, the depressed economies of African countries have left 
their labor costs as low as anywhere else in the world.74 
                                                 
64 Id. at 165–66. 
65 Id. at 167. 
66 Id. at 166. 
67 Id. at 159–60. 
68 Id. at 160. 
69 MOYO, supra note 5, at 99. 
70 Id. at 100. 
71 Hunter, supra note 6, at 870–71. 
72 MOYO, supra note 5, at 102. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 99. 
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Despite these positives, MNEs still stay away from Africa. Major deter-
rents include infrastructure and administrative difficulties. In many African 
countries, the infrastructure is poor, which makes producing and transporting 
goods much more expensive.75 Additionally, corruption, bureaucracy, and 
highly circumscribed regulatory systems scare potential investors away from 
the continent.76 Africa does hold some of the world’s most complex adminis-
trative FDI regimes, such as Cameroon, where the average FDI enterprise 
takes 426 days and fifteen procedures to obtain all proper licensing.77 
These obstacles to FDI are substantial in Africa, but are they found in 
Ghana? If these types of economic and political hurdles are not found in 
Ghana, then the only issue remaining in analyzing the comparative attrac-
tiveness of the FDI climates of Ghana and China will be the FDI policy 
that each country has enacted. The next Part will compare the backgrounds 
of Ghana and China and show that the above hurdles are not a factor in 
comparing the two countries, so that this Note may progress on to evaluat-
ing the differences in each country’s FDI policy. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Restricted Beginnings 
The communist People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, while 
the Republic of Ghana was the first African country to achieve colonial 
independence eight years later.78 Following each country’s revolutionary 
period, both countries adopted major isolationist policies.79 China, under 
Mao Zedong, was virtually closed to the outside world and its investors.80 
Ghana similarly sought to limit foreign enterprise ownership and control 
from the onset of its 1957 independence.81 Both were motivated by similar 
sentiments of independence and self-sufficiency.82 Under the Great Leap 
Forward campaign, China attempted to achieve self-sufficiency by power-
ing its economy completely by communes. The Ghanaians believed that in 
                                                 
75 Id. at 100. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. (compared to South Korea, where this only takes seventeen days and ten proce-
dures on average). 
78 Felix Wemheue, Dealing with Responsibility for the Great Leap Famine in the People’s 
Republic of China, 201 THE CHINA Q. 176, 179 (Mar 16, 2010); CONKLIN & LECRAW, supra 
note 20, at 53. 
79 See CONKLIN & LECRAW, supra note 20. 
80 MAURICE MEISNER, MAO ZEDONG 89–91 (2007). 
81 CONKLIN & LECRAW, supra note 20, at 53. 
82 Id. 
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order to attain political independence, Ghana needed to achieve econom-
ic independence.83 
B. Collapse 
The idea of self-sufficiency did not aid the development of either 
country’s economy, as both had fallen into disrepair by the late 1970s.84 
The shortcomings of the Great Leap Forward led to one of history’s larg-
est incidents of famine—causing the estimated deaths of 15–40 million peo-
ple in two years.85 Ghana had fallen into perpetual economic crisis, marked 
by currency devaluation, high interest rates, rapid inflation, and massive 
capital flight.86 
C. FDI Liberalization 
After the 1976 death of Mao Zedong, China began a period known as 
Gaige Kaifang (literally “opening up and reform”), which included the lib-
eralization of trade and FDI policy.87 China enacted its first statute govern-
ing foreign investment in 1979.88 For the next thirty years, China main-
tained largely open policies to attract high quantities of foreign investment 
into the country by way of preferential treatment.89 By 1994, China was of-
fering reduced tax rates for MNEs located in special geographic zones and 
tax holidays for manufacturing enterprises that were scheduled to operate 
for more than ten years.90 China saw immediate success with FDI.91 The 
first wave of FDI came in the 1980s, mostly in the form of joint ventures; a 
second wave came in the 1990s as wholly owned foreign enterprises; and 
now, China is experiencing a third wave, in the form of mergers and acqui-
sitions.92 By 2000, China’s annual FDI inflow was $41 billion;93 this figure 
grew to $80 billion by 2006.94 
                                                 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Wemheue, supra note 78, at 176–77. 
86 CONKLIN & LECRAW, supra note 20, at 53. 
87 Patrice C. McMahon & Yue Zou, Thirty Years of Reform and Opening Up: Teaching 
International Relations in China, 44 POL. SCI. & POL. 115, 115 (2011). 
88 John Zhengdong Huang, China on the Horizon: Exploring Current Legal Issues: 
An Introduction to Foreign Investment Laws in the People’s Republic of China, 28 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 471, 472 (1995) [hereinafter Huang, China on the Horizon]. 
89 12th Five-Year Plan Is Off to a Good Start, CHINA LAW & PRACTICE (May 2011). 
90 Huang, China on the Horizon, supra note 88, at 483. 
91 Id. at 471. 
92 Hui Huang, China’s New Regulation on Foreign M&A: Green Light or Red Flag?, 
30 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 802, 802 (2007) [hereinafter Huang, China’s New Regulation]. 
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After amassing $622.4 billion from FDI in the thirty years following 
1978, China was able to “afford [being] more selective” with FDI.95 The 
Chinese developed fears that foreigners were taking over too many domes-
tic industries.96 In 2006, foreign investors controlled the top five businesses 
in all industrial sectors that were open to foreigners.97 That year, China’s 
National Development and Reform Commission announced a shift in its 
foreign investment policy that would focus more on the quality than the 
quantity of incoming FDI.98 The result was the elimination of tax breaks, 
the restriction of many industrial sectors, and increased restriction and scru-
tiny placed upon foreign mergers and acquisitions.99 Despite the change in 
policy, China still amassed nearly $100 billion of FDI inflow in 2010.100 
Ghana did not have the same success with attracting FDI inflows. 
Ghana began relaxing its FDI restrictions in 1985.101 The prime motivator 
was the International Monetary Fund and its Structural Adjustment Pro-
gram, which advocated liberalized ownership and control practices.102 
Ghana realized that if it were too restrictive, then capital would go to other 
low-wage countries.103 Ghana declared the first wave of its “open-door” 
policies for foreign investors starting in 1985.104 While Ghana has become 
West Africa’s largest FDI recipient,105 last year it only logged $2.5 billion 
in FDI inflows, compared to China’s $106 billion.106 
D. Socioeconomic Comparison 
Posed again: does Ghana have the same social and economic obstacles 
that have deterred FDI flows to the rest of Africa?107 The answer is no; 
                                                                                                                         
93 Hunter, supra note 6, at 852. 
94 MOYO, supra note 5, at 99. 
95 Huang, China’s New Regulation, supra note 92, at 808. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Steven M. Dickinson & Daniel P. Harris, Dickinson and Harris on Changes to Foreign 
Investment in China, 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 1197 (Lexis 2008). 
99 Id. 
100 12th Five-Year Plan Is Off to a Good Start, supra note 89. 
101 CONKLIN & LECRAW, supra note 20, at 54. 
102 See id. 
103 Id. 
104 See Ken Laryea, Recent Investment Legislation in Ghana, 39 INT’L. & COMP. L. Q. 
197, 197 (1990); see also Ghana Investment Act (P.N.D.C. Law No. 116/1985) (Ghana). 
105 U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2011, supra note 
12, at 41. 
106 Id. at 187, 189. 
107 See CONKLIN & LECRAW, supra note 20, at 17–21. 
730 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:717 
Ghana is much more developed, socially and economically, than the rest 
of sub-Saharan Africa.108 In fact, Ghana’s development in these areas is 
only slightly behind China’s.109 In the socioeconomic context as it relates 
to FDI, MNEs are attracted by adequate infrastructure, a suitably educated 
workforce, and cheap labor costs.110 Ghana is comparable to China in each 
of these respects. 
In terms of infrastructure, China is more developed, but not by a large 
margin. The World Bank rates China’s infrastructure a 3.54 out of 5 (27th in 
the World), and Ghana’s a 2.52 out of 5 (71st in the World).111 Similarly, 
the World Economic Forum rates China’s infrastructure a 4.4 out of 7 (50th 
in the world), and Ghana’s a 2.9 out of 7 (106th in the world).112 The differ-
ence between infrastructures seems to have a minimal effect on those doing 
business in each country. When given a list of fifteen common problems of 
doing business in underdeveloped countries, 12.5% of those doing business 
in Ghana listed inadequate infrastructure as a top five problem—compared 
to 8% for those doing business in China.113 
The Ghanaian workforce has also proved to be just as capable as the 
Chinese workforce. The World Economic Forum rates Ghana’s education 
and training as 3.3 out of 7 (108th in the world), while rating China’s as 
4.2 out of 7 (60th in the world).114 Interestingly enough, inadequacy of 
education is a bigger problem in China than in Ghana: 7.4% of those doing 
business in China rank inadequate education as a top five problem, whereas 
nearly half that figure lists that problem in Ghana.115 Labor is also consider-
ably cheaper in Ghana, where a manufacturer can compensate workers with 
as little as $1.65 a day,116 while the average Chinese worker will make $1.36 
in just an hour.117 
                                                 
108 See infra notes 111–15. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Logistics Performance Index, THE WORLD BANK (Dec. 2, 2011), http://info.world
bank.org/etools/tradesurvey/Mode1a.asp. 
112 THE WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVE REPORT (2010–2011), at 





116 See Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2008 Human Rights Report: 
Ghana, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE (Feb. 25, 2009), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af
/119004.htm. 
117 See International Labor Comparisons, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Sept. 24, 
2012, 10:55 AM), http://www.bls.gov/fls/china.htm. 
2013] THE BLACK STAR AND RED DRAGON 731 
Because the infrastructure and workforce of Ghana and China are 
comparably developed, and the cost of labor is cheaper in Ghana, the last 
issue to analyze in determining which country has the more inviting FDI 
climate is the attractiveness of the countries’ FDI policies themselves. In 
the next Part, the Note will make this comparison. 
III. COMPARISON OF FDI POLICY 
Ghana’s FDI policy is more attractive than China’s for three reasons: it 
features fewer restrictions, offers more incentives, and has an administra-
tive process that is considerably more transparent and efficient. 
A. Restrictions 
1. Ownership Restrictions 
Ownership restrictions limit the industries in which foreigners can 
conduct FDI. Some restrictions will prohibit foreign enterprises entirely 
from dealing in a certain sector; others will require that a domestic party 
jointly own a foreign enterprise to a specified degree.118 Ownership re-
strictions can be the host country’s most effective means in protecting it-
self from the danger of losing control over its own economy if it becomes 
largely dependent on FDI.119 
Naturally, foreign-invested entities (FIEs) conduct business for the 
primary economic benefit of those outside of the host country’s borders, 
who have little attachment to the host country.120 The interests of FIEs and 
the host countries conflict in many sets of circumstances resulting in the 
flight of FIEs to other destinations. One issue is the regulation of wages 
and labor conditions. Host countries must fear the divestment of FIEs if the 
country decides to impose higher regulation on labor and wages.121 De-
pendence on FDI also means dependence on the MNC’s home country. 
FIEs will leave the host country when the local conditions worsen and the 
country is in a time of need.122 Japanese MNEs had been heavy investors in 
the Asia-Pacific region until the Japanese stock exchange crashed in 1991, 
causing large-scale FDI pull-outs.123 FIEs are also loyal to the interests of 
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their home country.124 Canadian-owned Inco had to reduce jobs due to a 
low demand for its product, nickel.125 It was urged by the Canadian gov-
ernment to reduce jobs in Indonesia in order to preserve Canadian jobs, and 
it ultimately took such action.126 Requiring some degree of domestic owner-
ship is a way to ensure that a significant portion of the FIE’s control is allot-
ted to a party whose interests align with those of the host country.127 
China operates by categorizing all industries as encouraged, prohibit-
ed, or restricted, and then mandating different levels of ownership, accord-
ingly.128 Investments in “encouraged” areas are simpler and face no own-
ership restrictions.129 “Prohibited” areas do not allow foreign investment.130 
“Restricted” areas can be harder to classify as they require extra approval 
and a degree of domestic ownership.131 Restricted sectors do not foreclose 
on foreign investment per se, but proposed investments in this category are 
sparingly approved, as the delay during the process discourages applica-
tions.132 “The practice in Beijing has been to simply fail to respond to re-
quests for approval.”133 
The major problem in this system is that the categories often change. Cat-
egories are laid out in the Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment 
in Industries (Catalogue).134 Since the Catalogue was introduced in 1995, it 
has been amended three times, most recently in 2007.135 For example, in-
vestment in real estate was specifically encouraged in 2004, but prohibited 
just three years later.136 This constant flip-flopping is a manifestation of the 
volatility of China’s underlying FDI policy aims. For example, China’s pol-
icy had previously supported export-oriented business and allowed related 
industries to be “encouraged.”137 Now, China discourages investment in 
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industries in which China has already developed a proficiency including 
export-oriented businesses.138 
Ghana, by comparison, has far fewer ownership restrictions. The coun-
try only has compulsory domestic partnership requirements in the fishing 
and mining industries.139 Even more, the only sectors reserved solely for 
wholly-owned domestic enterprises are taxis, gambling (excluding soc-
cer), kiosk or market sales, and hair salons.140 Ghana likely restricts in-
vestments in mining and fishing because natural resources such as miner-
als and land are a part of any nation’s wealth and heritage.141 Bans on 
foreign kiosk sales, taxis, and hair salons reflect the tendency of countries 
to discourage foreign investment in areas where foreigners will not bring 
new technology, processes, or add value past what the domestic industry 
has already achieved.142 
2. Currency Exchange Restrictions 
Economic considerations motivate countries to limit the outflow of 
their currency. When outflows of a country’s currency increase, the supply 
of the currency in the international sphere is then increased, which puts 
downward pressure on the value of the currency. In the case of FIEs, when 
such a venture removes its earnings from the host country and exchanges 
the host-country currency for another, the supply of the currency is in-
creased and the value is decreased. 
Countries will attempt to limit FDI-related currency outflows at a 
number of stages. China restricts the ability to be able to have a foreign 
exchange account.143 China created the State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange (SAFE) to implement its exchange policy.144 SAFE may out-
right deny the right of an FIE to maintain a foreign exchange account.145 
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Additionally, SAFE restricts FIEs that operate in the current account mar-
ket (imports and exports) to retaining a maximum of fifty percent of their 
export earnings in a foreign currency.146 Non-export/import companies are 
processed on an opaque case-by-case basis.147 
China also takes things a step further by limiting the amount of foreign 
loans that an FIE can use to fund its venture. Medium and long-term debt 
is capped at the difference between an FIE’s total investment and regis-
tered capital.148 This measure is not an explicit currency exchange restriction, 
but it operates with a similar effect. With debt financing being a prevalent 
means of capitalization, it is likely to be a part of any business venture. 
Foreign loans mean that a portion of the earnings must be repaid to foreign 
entities in foreign currency. Domestic loans mean that the same return 
must be paid to a domestic lender in the domestic currency. These pro-
ceeds are thereby kept in the country. 
Ghana has a much simpler process that features no exchange regime or 
restrictions. The country guarantees the “unconditioned [currency] ex-
change” for dividends, net profits, loan payments, and remittances and pro-
ceeds for the sale of assets or interests in the enterprise.149 These explicit 
havens of currency exchange encompass any type of investment that an 
FIE might try to make, and protect any type of return that would be pro-
duced in the process.150 
3. Capital Requirements 
A capital requirement is a minimum amount of funding that a proposed 
venture must have before it can begin operations. This ensures that a venture 
is adequately capitalized and financially stable. Imposed upon FIEs, it also 
has the effect of deterring ventures that have more limited funding. 
In China, the capital requirement minimum varies by sector and industry 
with the minimum being RMB30,000—about $47,000.151 In the service sec-
tor, some notable industries that have capital requirements are account-
ing,152 advertising,153 construction,154 educational institutions,155 financial 
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services,156 retail/wholesale,157 freight and transporting,158 hospitals,159 and 
law firms.160 In the manufacturing sector, the Chinese have restricted such 
notable industries as automotives,161 food,162 and publishing.163 One would 
be hard-pressed to find any FDI opportunity in China that would avoid a 
minimum capital requirement. In an extreme case, China requires invest-
ment-type companies (that operate by taking over existing Chinese com-
panies) to have $30 million in registered capital.164 
Ghana has capital requirements for all FDI ventures, but they are lower 
and much simpler. Joint ventures with domestic partners are subject to a 
$10,000 requirement, whereas wholly owned foreign enterprises are sub-
ject to a $50,000 requirement.165 In the most extreme case, trading compa-
nies—those that deal only in buying and selling of goods (but not the pro-
duction)—are subject to a $300,000 minimum.166 
4. Restrictions Comparison Summary 
Compared to China, Ghana has made its FDI restrictions minimally ap-
plied, straightforward, and less intrusive. From the outset, China either ex-
plicitly or indirectly bans foreign participation in many industries. Also, in 
China, an area that is unrestricted to foreigners in one year may become com-
pletely prohibited four years later. Ghana only bans foreign participation in 
four specific types of businesses,167 and only requires a domestic partner for 
mining and fishing ventures.168 Ghana also has lower, less deterring capital 
requirements for a foreign start-up enterprise. Although Ghana still fea-
tures these restrictions, they are very clear and do not reach the astronomi-
cal levels seen in China’s FDI regime. After the enterprise has been estab-
lished, Ghana also places less of a burden on the FIE by allowing for freer 
currency exchange. The Chinese regime has established an opaque SAFE 
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administration that mandates how much currency FIEs can exchange on a 
case-by-case basis with virtually no guidelines for its determination. Ghana, 
on the other hand, provides for the unconditioned currency exchange of all 
types of profit, remuneration, proceeds, or payments that an FIE could have. 
It is clear that Ghana’s FDI climate is significantly less restrictive than 
China’s. As compared to an investor acting within the Chinese FDI cli-
mate, the Ghana-minded investor will be able to establish an enterprise 
remarkably quicker and with near-guaranteed certainty. The costs of doing 
so will be less and the enterprise will be less encumbered in its continued 
operation. The Ghanaian FIE will not have to worry about changing poli-
cies that jeopardize the standing of its foreign ownership. 
B. Incentives 
1. Tax and Duty Incentives 
In general, tax competition can be the pivotal factor when the other fac-
tors in competing host countries are roughly equal.169 Tax advantages can 
translate to large yields in savings from operations abroad. A manufacturing 
firm operating in a lower-income nation will gain a three percent rise in 
production for every one percent that a tax policy reduces the cost of capi-
tal.170 Common types of FDI tax incentives include reductions in corporate 
tax rates, tax holidays (deferrals of taxes for a number of years), accelerated 
depreciation allowances, tax credits for profit that is reinvested in the host 
country, and exemptions from export duty or value-added taxes.171 
The tax incentives that China used to ascend to FDI prominence have 
been largely repealed.172 Prior to the change, China reduced income tax to as 
low as fifteen percent for foreigners who invested in special economic zones, 
coastal cities, or key economic and technological development sectors.173 
Additionally, manufacturing operations scheduled to operate for more than 
ten years were exempted from taxation during their first two profit-making 
years.174 FIEs were even exempt from value-added taxes if they were operat-
ing in a “priority industry.”175 Tax breaks for foreign enterprises were virtual-
ly eliminated in 2007,176 along with value-added tax exemptions in 2008.177 
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China also scaled back the amount of import duty incentives that it had 
previously offered. Until 1996, China had given tariff exemptions and prefer-
ences for equipment and raw materials imported by newly approved foreign 
enterprises, as well as equipment imported for major construction projects.178 
Now, China reserves these types of incentives only for FIEs that operate in 
high technology.179 
Ghana has not been so picky in giving tax and import duty incentives. 
Ghana does not give FIEs special tax incentives that are not available to 
domestic enterprises; rather it gives FIEs national treatment by applying 
the same tax code that governs Ghanaian businesses.180 FIEs are eligible to 
receive the same import duties for capital goods that are given to domestic 
Ghanaian entities, while also being able to apply for special duty exemp-
tions that would not be available to locals.181 
2. Other Incentives 
Ghana’s FDI legislation features a unique provision that allows for 
discretion and flexibility in attracting FIEs. Under the Ghana Investment 
Promotion Centre (GIPC) Act, the administration may, “for the purpose of 
promoting identified strategic or major investments ... negotiate specific 
incentive packages in addition to the incentive provided under [the GIPC 
Act].”182 This discretionary power could allow Ghana to grant incentive 
packages similar to those where Alabama offered $253 million incentive 
packages to get a Mercedes-Benz plant in 1993 and a Hyundai plant in 
2002.183 In the Hyundai package, Alabama went as far as to put forward 
$77 million to train production workers along with offering $158 million 
in infrastructure improvements and tax abatements, $34 million for the site 
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purchase, and $10 million in advertising to state employees.184 It is worth 
noting that the GIPC Act gives the Ghanaian administration the latitude to 
afford additional incentives.185 
Ghana also facilitates the movement of an FIE’s workers. The GIPC Act 
guarantees a simple visa system for FIEs.186 Enterprises with $10,000–
$100,000 in invested capital are entitled to one immigration visa; enterprises 
with $100,000–$500,000 are entitled to two visas; and enterprises with 
greater than $500,000 are entitled to four visas.187 FIEs that need additional 
visas may petition for them.188 
3. Incentives Summary and Conclusion 
At an earlier point in time, China might have offered a much more en-
ticing package for FDI hopefuls, but now it is evident that Ghana has put 
out a sweeter pot. China has become a heavy destination for FDI, and thus 
does not need to go to extremes to offer attractive incentives. It has reached 
a point where it can be more selective with investors. Now, if China does 
offer any incentive, then it is offered only to a high priority investor, such as 
one who imports articles for scientific and educational use.189 
Ghana has not reached this point of FDI prosperity, and thus has not 
become as selective. It offers its incentives to all FIEs, regardless of sector 
or high-end dealings, and is even willing to work with proposed ventures 
on a case-by-case basis for additional incentives. Ghana even offers a wid-
er base of import duty exemptions to FIEs than it does to its own domestic 
base. Additionally, the Ghanaian incentive scheme has not changed at all 
in recent years, whereas the Chinese scheme has constantly constricted 
since 2007. In addition to being less restrictive, the Ghanaian FDI climate 
is also more highly incentivized. 
C. Administration of FDI Policy 
Aside from incentives and restrictions, how administrations implement 
their FDI policy can have a large effect on the viability of establishing a 
foreign-invested enterprise within a country’s borders. A simpler startup 
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process required by the host country can allow ventures to be founded 
quicker and cheaper, whereas more complicated systems stick prospective 
FIEs with more costs, delays, and uncertainty. The transparency and con-
sistency of a host country’s policies can reduce the risk for foreign ventures. 
Finally, a guaranteed impartial dispute resolution process can also reduce 
some of the risk that the foreign enterprise will face by investing abroad. 
1. Start-Up Process 
In general, regulatory hassles in the application process can significantly 
deter foreign investors, as they create much unpredictability, can triple ad-
ministrative costs, and can typically be avoided by investing in an alterna-
tive destination.190 Regulatory hassles might include having multiple ap-
proval organizations, excessive processing fees, slow approval processes, or 
seemingly randomly rejection. By contrast, having a more centralized, fast-
er, and more transparent process can make a destination riper for FDI. 
China’s startup process is more akin to the former situation. The ap-
proval process goes through two major bodies: the National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Foreign Commerce 
(MOFCOM).191 All proposals must be submitted to the NDRC for approval, 
which includes compliance with Chinese laws, national security implica-
tions, and economic development effects.192 If approved, investors must then 
apply to MOFCOM for approval to legally establish a company.193 Then the 
investors must apply for a business license from the State Administration 
of Industry and Commerce (SAIC).194 After this, the investor needs to reg-
ister with China’s tax and foreign exchange agencies.195 If the enterprise is a 
Greenfield operation—a start-up company—it must gain approval from the 
Environmental Protection Ministry and the Ministry of Land Resources.196 
However, many FDI ventures are through mergers with, or acquisitions of, 
existing domestic companies.197 Prospective FDI ventures that seek to start 
in this manner are subject to an additional level of scrutiny by MOFCOM.198 
Mergers and acquisitions will not be allowed if they involve a “key indus-
try,” “famous trademark,” or could harm China’s “economic security.”199 
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Additionally, any merger or acquisition involving more than $200,000 is 
subject to automatic antitrust review.200 Under this rule, in 2009, MOFCOM 
rejected a $2.4 billion bid by Coca-Cola to buy the Huiyuan Juice Group, 
China’s household name beverage company, which controlled forty-two 
percent of China’s juice market share.201 MOFCOM feared that the acqui-
sition would harm the competitiveness of the industry.202 In this same fash-
ion, a bid for China’s largest machine manufacturer was also rejected.203 
The difficulty in entering China through a merger or acquisition is that the 
criteria for rejection are ill-defined. The trend seems to be that the acquisi-
tion of larger names or more dominant players in the Chinese market will 
not be tolerated. Some even go as far as to accuse China of using these re-
jections to retaliate against Western rejections of some major international 
bids by Chinese companies.204 The simplest way to summarize the Chinese 
standard on foreign mergers and acquisitions might be that “foreigners are 
permitted to purchase non-majority interests in strong, successful Chinese 
companies, but only if there is some added benefit, such as transfer of tech-
nology, advanced management or access to foreign markets.”205 
Ghana employs a much simpler startup system. It is essentially a “one-
stop shop.”206 The process is simple: register with the Ghana Investment 
Promotion Centre (GIPC), and when the documents are “in order” certifica-
tion will be issued within three business days, and any additional licensing 
issues will be handled by the GIPC.207 This first major advantage of this 
policy is that it is an extremely quick system, as an FDI hopeful needs to 
wait only five business days for the application to be processed. The second 
advantage is that any additional approval or steps that need to be taken will 
be handled by the GIPC. This can be extremely helpful if a type of venture 
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would require additional steps of approval under domestic law (some exam-
ples being obtaining certain business licenses or operating permits). Unlike 
the Chinese system, the FIE does not to need to worry about being encum-
bered by the intricacies of the Ghanaian domestic regulation. As long as the 
proposed FIE meets the GIPC requirements, the remaining details will be 
taken care of by the Ghanaian authority. 
Investors normally react very well to the “one-stop” format. Singapore 
and Ireland have created investment promotion agencies that act as one-stop 
shops to help foreign enterprises handle the commercial, administrative, and 
legal details, and now these countries are behind only Hong Kong in FDI 
inflows per capita.208 
2. Transparency 
The most attractive policy on paper does not, in itself, create the most 
attractive FDI climate. A country may have a poor FDI climate because of 
either the policy itself, or because there is substantial uncertainty or insta-
bility in the policy.209 Opaqueness and volatility can have a damaging ef-
fect on the attractiveness of FDI policy. 
In China, the regulatory system is “opaque” and administration is 
largely unaccountable.210 Chinese regulators have substantial discretion to 
impose unexplained restrictions and the administrative bodies are not re-
quired to publish (with substantial analysis) decisions on foreign invest-
ment approvals or denials.211 U.S. investors have reported to the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce that regulators at times rely on unpublished internal 
guidelines in making decisions.212 
Additionally, Chinese regulations can change seemingly overnight and 
without notice. When China’s National Development Reform Commission 
revised the Catalogue in 2007, no English language version was released and 
the English website was “strangely silent” on the revision.213 RWE Thames 
Water withdrew from a water treatment project in 2004 when the Chinese 
government changed the rules on rate of return for investments in its class.214 
The volatility of Chinese policy also raises somewhat of an expropriation 
issue. Investments in real estate, construction, luxury hotels, and office build-
ings were encouraged by 2004 policy but restricted in 2007.215 In an even 
more extreme case, foreign investment in residential housing was encouraged 
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in 2004, but absolutely prohibited in 2007.216 In the first case, the change 
would have left investors with the option of divesting entirely or selling the 
required ownership interest to a domestic party. In the second case, the for-
eign investor would be forced to divest entirely. 
The system is fundamentally more transparent and stable in Ghana. For 
one, the policies do not change. The relevant policies have been laid out in 
the same act and have stood, without amendment, since 1994.217 There is no 
opaque approval process because, unlike China, which bases its approvals 
around abstract criteria like economic security and key industry analysis, the 
Ghanaian requirements are all concrete. In Ghana, the FDI venture only 
needs to supply the required capital and application.218 Additionally, all of the 
requirements, incentives, and processes are spelled out in the GIPC Act.219 
3. Dispute Resolution 
The process for dispute resolution can ensure that an FIE’s financial in-
terests are protected. Ideally, an FIE would want a process that is impartial, 
transparent, independent, and relatively expedient. 
In China, the court system is not independent from other branches of the 
government, so the other branches may—and often do—intervene at any 
time or disregard judgments from courts.220 Chinese officials urge firms to-
wards Alternative Dispute Resolution,221 but this might not lead to the fair-
est result in China. The Chinese party has never lost an FDI-related arbitra-
tion dispute in China.222 A foreign investor in China, thus, has no guarantee 
of obtaining a fair judgment in China. To the contrary, it seems like an un-
just result is more likely. 
In Ghana, the GIPC Act assigns FIEs specific dispute resolution 
rights.223 Foreign investors have the right to arbitration under the rules of the 
UN Commission of International Trade Law, any bilateral or multilateral 
agreement between Ghana and the investor’s home country, and any other 
process agreed to by the investor and the Ghanaian government.224 If there 
is a disagreement between the investor and the government regarding the 
method of dispute settlement, then the investor’s choice will prevail.225 Stand-
ing in stark contrast to China, Ghana gives investors notions of fairness by 
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supplying procedural justice protocol recognized by the international com-
munity. Additionally, the FIE has the upper hand in forum selection and 
method disputes. This system operates to give the FIE a more attainable 
promise of impartialness and equity. 
4. Administration Summary and Conclusion 
The administration of Ghanaian FDI policy is much more transparent, 
stable, convenient, and fair. At the onset of the venture, the Ghanaian-minded 
enterprise will be approved much quicker than its Chinese-minded counter-
part, which will be encumbered by multiple levels of scrutiny and a more 
opaque approval process. The Ghanaian FIE will feel a higher level of se-
curity knowing that the policy that governs it will remain unchanged, but 
the Chinese FIE will have to assume the risk of sudden changes that might 
have effects as severe as the effective expropriation of the enterprise’s in-
terest. Finally, should any disputes arise, the Ghanaian FIE has a better 
chance at fair, independent, and impartial adjudication. 
CONCLUSION 
China is the world’s hot button investment locale, but the FDI climate in 
Ghana merits attention from internationally-vested business entities. Unlike 
the increasingly restrictive Chinese climate, the Ghanaian climate allows for 
a wider range of incentives, while hindering FIEs with fewer restrictions. 
Ghana’s FDI policy is also implemented in a clearer, more stable manner. 
Where China’s policy seems to be underscored by the deterrence of FDI that 
does not deal in high technology or a critical developing industry, the Gha-
naian policy is not so selective. With socioeconomic values that are either just 
as favorable or more favorable to foreign investment as those found in China, 
Ghana stands as an equally viable destination for FDI. Investors should strong-
ly consider operating in Ghana, as the Black Star country’s FDI climate is im-
mensely more favorable than the one found in the land of the Red Dragon. 
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